?Media Events, Globalization and Cultural Change?

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Sorry Winners

Bidders who receive both “common-value” and “private-value” signals about the value of an auction prize cannot fully infer their opponents’ information from the bidding. So bidders may overestimate the value of the prize and, subsequently, regret winning. When multiple objects are on sale, bidding in an auction provides information relevant to the other auctions, and sequential auctions are more vulnerable to overpayment and winners’ regret than are simultaneous auctions. With information inequality among bidders, the seller’s revenue is influenced by two contrasting effects. On the one hand, simultaneous auctions reduce the winner’s curse of less informed bidders and allow them to bid more aggressively. On the other hand, sequential auctions induce less informed bidders to bid more aggressively in early auctions to acquire information.      

A Wald test for the cointegration rank in nonstationary fractional systems

This paper develops new methods for determining the cointegration rank in a nonstationary fractionally integrated system, extending univariate optimal methods for testing the degree of integration. We propose a simple Wald test based on the singular value decomposition of the unrestricted estimate of the long run multiplier matrix. When the “strength” of the cointegrating relationship is less than 1/2, the test statistic has a standard asymptotic distribution, like Lagrange Multiplier tests exploiting local properties. We consider the behavior of our test under estimation of short run parameters and local alternatives. We compare our procedure with other cointegration tests based on different principles and find that the new method has better properties in a range of situations by using information on the alternative obtained through a preliminary estimate of the cointegration strength.     

What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.     

The effect of seasonal adjustment on the properties of business cycle regimes

We study the impact of seasonal adjustment on the properties of business cycle expansion and recession regimes using analytical, simulation and empirical methods. Analytically, we show that the X‐11 adjustment filter both reduces the magnitude of change at turning points and reduces the depth of recessions, with specific effects depending on the length of the recession. A Monte Carlo analysis using Markov‐switching models confirms these properties, with particularly undesirable effects in delaying the recognition of the end of a recession. However, seasonal adjustment can help to clarify the true regime when this is well underway. These results continue to hold when a seasonally non‐stationary process with regime‐dependent mean is misspecified as one with deterministic seasonal effects. The empirical findings, based on four coincident US business cycle indicators, reinforce the analytical and simulation results by showing that seasonal adjustment leads to the identification of longer and shallower recessions than obtained using unadjusted data. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eine Analyse ultimaten Verhaltens als Erklärungsansatz des moral hazards

For the insurance industry the moral hazard poses an incalculable risk. Changes in the behaviour of the insuree can lead to higher claims settlements and thus to higher premiums for the insured collective. Asymmetrically allocated information gives the insured individual the possibility to profit from the idea of common protection in a way that impairs insurer and the collective on the whole. Based on the homo oeconomicus model, economic concepts, first and foremost the agency theory of new institutional economics have made attempts to provide solutions for this management problem. However, behavioural economic experiments have demonstrated that the homo oeconomicus model does not fully succeed in describing the realities. As a result, the solutions proposed in these economic concepts have to be rated inadequate.The moral hazard is inherent in the conflicting realm of cooperation and defection, behaviour patterns that have evolved during the history of development of human behaviour. Ultimate behaviour analyses of these patterns do offer the opportunity to understand why humans behave in specific ways based on man's evolutionary origins and sources. Consequently, ultimate behaviour analyses could provide a solid foundation for the development of a framework giving insurers the possibility to exert influence on the insuree's behaviour and thus to assist in successfully impacting the moral hazard.     

Shaping buyer–supplier relationships in manufacturing contexts: Design and test of a contingency model

Although the idea that buyer–supplier partnerships can yield considerable benefits to firms is largely diffused among researchers and practitioners, the approach adopted in this paper is that no “one best way” exists in buyer–supplier relationships, but rather a “best way” for each specific exchange context. Hence, this paper proposes a contingency model for shaping and managing buyer–supplier relationships in manufacturing contexts. In order to test the model, an empirical study was performed on a sample of 45 buyer–supplier relationships within the Italian white goods industry. A three-dimensional performance indicator was computed to compare supplier performance achieved within relations matching the model's suggestions with those set differently. The results strongly suggest that suppliers involved in relationships set accordingly to the contingency model are likely to enjoy superior performance.     

From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules

Under numerical fiscal rules, such as those underpinning EMU,governments have strong temptations to use accounting tricksto meet the fiscal constraints. Given these political incentives,fiscal variables that in the past were regarded as a mere residualacquire a strategic role. This is the case of the so-calledstock-flow adjustment (SFA) which reconciles deficit and debtdevelopments. We develop a simple theoretical model where deficitsand two distinct SFA components (one that could be used to reducethe deficit figures and the other to impact debt figures instead)are determined as a result of a constrained optimisation byfiscal authorities. Econometric evidence provides results consistentwith the model findings. The SFA component related to the purposeto hide deficits rises with the recorded deficit, while thesales of financial assets designed to keep the debt under controlrise with both debt and deficit. When deficits are in excessof the 3 percent limit, accounting gimmicks become more sensitiveto the size of deficits. The SGP per se does not appear to increasethe extent to which higher deficits trigger more accountinggimmicks. However, the SGP seems associated with a more intenseuse of accounting gimmicks irrespective of the level of deficit.Such accounting practices have greatly contributed to the lossof credibility of Economic and Monetary Union's fiscal rules.If properly implemented, the reformed Pact, which stresses durableadjustment and long-run sustainability, should help curb suchperverse incentives. (JEL codes: E61, H62, H87)     

Stochastic dominance with pair-wise risk aversion

A class of stochastic orders is defined on the set of bivariate distribution functions. This class of orders is linearly orderable by inclusion. A family of utility functions, coherent with each of the stochastic orders previously defined, is determined. These utility functions represent pair-wise risk aversion. The relations with univariate stochastic orders are examined.